

(A condensation of paper by WE)

A Soviet ^{suggestion} proposal for the withdrawal of all troops from Germany has already been ~~un~~officially advanced. This may be officially proposed in the near future, in spite of Russian awareness that such a proposal would be rejected by the Western powers. There would be these advantages, however, in making such a proposal:

(a) Propaganda value in Western Germany and in pro-communist circles throughout the world;

(b) Creation of a favorable impression among some of the smaller nations, as being a step toward easing East-West tension.

The USSR might make the proposal through a future East German Government, which with Soviet compliance, would have the further advantage of increasing the prestige of that government. On the other hand, ~~this proposal for quadripartite withdrawal~~ ^{it} would have the disadvantage that, subject to its evaluation as a simple propaganda, the proposal would arouse in Western Europe and among the Satellites fears of German resurgence. Because of the Soviet position on the competence of the UN on the German question, it is unlikely that any such proposal would be made in UNGA.

It is possible, but unlikely, that the USSR will announce a unilateral withdrawal in the immediate future, intending to carry it out at a much later date. While this would have some value as a peace offensive designed to discourage western preparedness and while it would have some propaganda value in the western occupation zones, it would arouse an unfavorable reaction among the Satellites, and might tend to undermine solidarity within the Communist parties of Western Europe.

It is highly unlikely that the USSR would actually carry out a unilateral withdrawal prior to the summer of 1949. Only after a communist-control mechanism had been established and tested through gradual withdrawals, could Russian military occupation be terminated. It may be assumed that withdrawal would come only after a western evacuation of Berlin, and only after an East German Government had been established. In any event, nationals would be left behind to insure continued communist control, and the withdrawal would be in name only. After the circumstances assuring Russian control had been satisfied, Soviet withdrawal would have these advantages:

- (a) Enhancement of the prestige of the East German Government;
- (b) Regularization of long-term indirect control over Germany;
- (c) Dissociation of USSR from direct responsibility for repressive measures and unsatisfactory conditions in Germany;
- (d) Weakening of the position of the Western powers through the consequent impetus toward a unified Germany.

On the other hand, these disadvantages would result:

- (a) Loss of an advanced ~~base~~ military base;
- (b) Weakening of the Soviet economic position through a drop in goods delivered to the USSR and a rise in East German trade with the west;
- (c) Weakening of political control in Germany;
- (d) Weakening of the Soviet bargaining position in negotiations with the West;
- (e) Facilitation of western penetration of Eastern Germany.

The proposal of a simple withdrawal of troops from Berlin, either unilaterally or on a quadripartite basis, would have considerable propaganda advantage for the USSR, and might undermine the solidarity of the western powers. Neither this proposal nor its implementation would have any appreciable disadvantage

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for the USSR, ~~but would be entirely unacceptable to the West.~~

*(n.b. - conclusions of original paper
are not added here)*